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To examine how emotional content affects the amount of visual detail remembered, we had young and older adults
study neutral, negative, and positive objects. At retrieval, they distinguished same (identical) from similar (same
verbal label, different visual details) and new (nonstudied) objects. A same response to a same item indicated
memory for visual details (specific recognition), whereas a same or similar response to a same or similar item
signified memory for the general sort of object (general recognition). Both age groups showed enhanced specific
recognition for negative (not positive) objects. Young adults’ general recognition advantage also was restricted to
negative objects, whereas older adults showed enhanced general recognition for positive and negative objects.
Negative (not positive) content enhanced the visual specificity of memory in both ages, but positive content
conferred a general memory advantage only for older adults.
N
OT all memories are equally detailed. We might
remember seeing a coffee cup on our desk but fail to
recall its color, size, or shape, or we might remember seeing
a large, blue mug with a logo. Although at some level both of
these memories are accurate, the latter memory contains more
visual detail than the former. In the present study we in-
vestigated whether the amount of visual detail that young and
older adults remember about an object is inﬂuenced by the item’s
emotional valence (whether it is positive or negative).
Although we have previously shown that young adults
remember visual details for negative objects more often than
they do for neutral objects (Kensinger, Garoff-Eaton, &
Schacter, 2006), we had reason to believe that they might not
show a similar enhancement in memory for the visual details of
positive objects. The memory boost for negative items often
results from enhancements in the memory’s vividness or level
of detail (Dewhurst & Parry, 2000; Kensinger & Corkin, 2003;
Kensinger & Schacter, 2006; Ochsner, 2000). By contrast, when
there are memory enhancements for positive information, they
are more likely to result from an increased feeling of familiarity,
or from memory for general (nonspeciﬁc) information (Bless &
Schwartz, 1999; Clore et al., 2001; Fiedler, 2001; Gasper &
Clore, 2002; Ochsner). Thus, individuals often claim they
‘‘know’’ a positive item was presented but do not ‘‘remember’’
the details of its presentation (Dewhurst & Parry; Ochsner).
Participants can also be more likely to falsely or inconsistently
remember positive information compared with negative in-
formation (Kensinger & Schacter, 2006; Levine & Bluck,
2004), likely because of their increased reliance on schematic
information when processing positive information (Storbeck &
Clore, 2005). Given this prior research, we hypothesized that, in
young adults, negative (but not positive) emotional content
would lead to enhancement in memory for visual details.
It was less clear whether these divergent effects of positive
and negative emotion would occur in older adults. In general,
older adults have less access to information about the speciﬁc
details of an item’s presentation than do young adults
(Kensinger & Schacter, 1999; Koutstaal, 2003; Schacter,
Koutstaal, & Norman, 1997). Thus, we expected that there
would be an overall effect of age on the speciﬁcity of a memory.
The critical question, however, was whether valence would
differentially affect memory for visual detail in young and older
adults. Recent evidence has suggested that older adults are
more likely than young adults to focus attention on emotional
information (Fung, Carstensen, & Lutz, 1999; Hashtroudi,
Johnson, & Chrosniak, 1990; Isaacowitz, Wadlinger, Goren, &
Wilson, 2006; May, Rahhal, Berry, & Leighton, 2005), and
perhaps speciﬁcally on positive information (see Mather &
Carstensen, 2005; Mikels, Larkin, Reuter-Lorenz, & Carstensen,
2005). Although it is likely that enhanced attention toward
emotional information would result in a memory beneﬁt for that
information (see D’Argembeau & van der Linden, 2004), it is
less clear whether it would lead to enhancements primarily in
memory for the general theme of an item, or also would boost
older adults’ memory for visual detail. On the one hand, if
positive and negative stimuli are processed in fundamentally
different ways from one another by both young and older adults
(i.e., with positive stimuli processed in a heuristic way and
negative stimuli processed in a detail-oriented fashion), then
both ages may show enhancements in memory for detail only
for negative items and not for positive items. On the other hand,
if negative content enhances the speciﬁcity of young adults’
memories because their attention is drawn toward negative
stimuli (Dolan & Vuilleumier, 2003; LeDoux, 2000; Mather &
Carstensen, 2003), then the effect could be reversed in older
adults, who tend to focus more attention, and more elaborative
encoding processes, on positive than on negative information
(Isaacowitz et al, 2006; Mather & Knight, 2005).
Despite increased interest in understanding the effects of
advancing age on memory for emotional information (reviewed
by Kensinger, 2006; Mather & Carstensen, 2005), to our
knowledge only one prior study has used retrieval tasks that can
tease apart visually speciﬁc from more general memories. In
this prior study, Denburg, Buchanan, Tranel, and Adolphs
(2003) assessed participants’ memories for the general theme
and speciﬁc visual details of complex visual scenes (e.g., a dead
Journal of Gerontology: PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCES Copyright 2007 by The Gerontological Society of America
2007, Vol. 62B, No. 4, P208–P215
P208body in a forest). Their results suggested that, throughout the
adult life span, positive and negative emotional content can be
associated with enhancements in memory for ‘‘gist’’ but with
impairments in memory for visual details. They did not,
however, distinguish memory for details of the emotional item
in the scene (e.g., the dead body) from memory for details of
the nonemotional context (e.g., the forest). An extensive
literature has demonstrated that the emotional elements of an
event often are remembered well, whereas nonemotional
elements often are forgotten (reviewed by Reisburg & Heuer,
2004). Thus, it is plausible that the results of this prior study
would have been different had the authors assessed memory for
the visual details of the emotional elements only, rather than
also requiring memory for details peripheral to the emotional
content of the scenes. In fact, a few studies have demonstrated
that, at least in young adults, memory for both the speciﬁc
visual details as well as the general theme of information can
be enhanced for emotional items (Burke, Heuer, & Reisberg,
1992; Kensinger, Garoff-Eaton, & Schacter, 2006, 2007). For
example, when presented with a scene depicting a snake in
a forest, young adults remember the visual details of the snake,
as well as the fact that there was a snake. By contrast, they fail
to remember the visual details of the forest – details not linked
to the emotional element (Kensinger et al., 2007).
In the present study, we examined young and older adults’
abilities to remember the visual details of positive, negative, or
neutral objects that were presented in isolation against a blank
background. We previously showed that young adults are more
likely to remember the visual details of negative objects than of
neutral ones (Kensinger, Garoff-Eaton, & Schacter, 2006). Our
goals of the present study were to investigate whether young
adults also would show enhanced memory speciﬁcity for
positive items and to examine whether the effects of emotion on
memory for visual detail would change between young
adulthood and old age.
EXPERIMENT 1
In Experiment 1, we addressed our goals within an
experiment in which young and older adults were tested after
different delays (30 min for the older adults and 2 days for the
young adults) in order to roughly numerically equate the mem-
ory performance of the two groups. We reasoned that if the two
groups did not have similar memory performance for the
neutral items, then it could be difﬁcult to interpret age dif-
ferences in emotional memory enhancements. For example, if
older adults’ performance was worse than younger adults’, and
if older adults also showed a greater emotional memory
enhancement than did young adults, then that additional
enhancement could simply reﬂect the fact that there was more
room for improvement in the older adults than in the young
adults.
At study, participants viewed positive, negative, and neutral
objects. At test, they distinguished ‘‘same’’ objects (identical to
those studied) from ‘‘similar’’ (same verbal label, different
visual details) or ‘‘new’’ ones. Consistent with previous studies
using variants of this paradigm (Garoff et al., 2005; Kensinger,
Garoff-Eaton, & Schacter, 2006), we considered a same
response to a same item to reﬂect memory for speciﬁc visual
details, or ‘‘speciﬁc recognition.’’ Collectively, same or similar
items given either a same or a similar response were considered
to reﬂect memory for at least the general sort of object, or
‘‘general recognition.’’ (All results remained qualitatively the
same when we computed general recognition as same or similar
responses to same items, i.e., when we did not include
responses to similar items in the general recognition score.)
Thus, we assessed the effects of negative and positive
content on young and older adults’ memories for (a) speciﬁc
visual details (speciﬁc recognition) and (b) general object
information (general recognition).
It is worth noting that although our measurement of general
recognition shares many similarities with the conceptualization
of so-called gist memory, the two also differ in a couple of
important ways. First, gist memory often has been used to refer
to memory for the general theme of previously presented
information in the absence of memory for speciﬁc details (e.g.,
Brainerd & Reyna, 2005). In the present study, we conceptu-
alized general recognition as memory for at least the gist
information, regardless of whether individuals also remembered
the speciﬁc visual details. Second, gist memory often refers to
the extraction of commonalities among a series of items or to
inferences regarding presented information (e.g., Adams,
Labouvie-Vief, Hobart, & Dorosz, 1990; Adams, Smith,
Nyquist, & Perlmutter, 1997; Gould, Trevithick, & Dixon,
1991). In the present study, general recognition reﬂected
memory for the general theme of a single item, not for
a common theme shared among multiple items.
METHODS
Participants
Participants were 32 young and 32 older adults (see Table 1
for demographic information). Young adults were Harvard or
Boston College students. Older adults were recruited from
a database maintained at Harvard University or through the
Harvard Cooperative Program on Aging. All participants were
native English speakers with normal or corrected-to-normal
vision and with no history of a neuropsychological or psychi-
atric disorder. No participant listed taking medications that
affected the central nervous system. We obtained informed
consent in a method approved by the Harvard University and
Boston College Institutional Review Boards.
Materials and Procedure
Materials.—Materials comprised 180 pairs of photo objects
(from Kensinger, Garoff-Eaton, & Schacter, 2006 and supple-
mented with additional positive objects). Pairs shared the same
verbal label (e.g., were both umbrellas) but differed in other
perceptual features (e.g., color, shape, size, orientation). We
selected the ﬁnal images from a larger set that had been rated by
a separate group of 6 young and 6 older adults for their valence
and arousal, using 9-point Likert-type scales (with low numbers
indicating low valence and low arousal, respectively). One third
of the selected objects were negative and arousing (i.e., valence
, 3.5, arousal ratings   5), one third were positive and
arousing (i.e., valence . 5.5, arousal   5), and one third were
neutral (i.e., valence ¼ 3–6, arousal , 5). The positive and
negative objects did not differ from one another in arousal or in
EMOTION AND MEMORY SPECIFICITY P209absolute valence, p . .15, and positive and negative objects
were more arousing than neutral ones, p , .001. Valence and
arousal ratings for each group of objects did not differ for the
young and older adults, p . .15.
We matched negative, positive, and neutral pairs for the
overall similarity of the two items, the dimensions (color, size,
shape, orientation) that differed between the two items, and the
familiarity of the items (see Kensinger, Garoff-Eaton, &
Schacter, 2006 for details of the matching procedures).
Study procedure.—Participants viewed 144 objects (one
third of each emotion type) for 1 s. Following the object’s
presentation, participants indicated, by key press, whether the
object would ﬁt inside the drawer of a ﬁling cabinet.
Test procedure.—After approximately a 30-min delay for
the older adults, and a 2-day delay for the young adults,
participants performed a surprise object-recognition task. On
subsequent debrieﬁng forms, all participants indicated that they
were surprised that their memory was assessed. We chose
these delays because pilot data indicated that neither ceiling nor
ﬂoor effects existed for participants when tested after these
delays, and because these delays resulted in approximate,
numerical matching of performance for the young and older
adults. (Note that our use of this matching procedure was only
to provide numerical equation of memory performance; we do
not claim that changing the delay interval equated the processes
associated with memory performance in the two age groups.)
Participants were presented with 180 objects: 72 (24 negative,
24 positive, 24 neutral) were identical to those that had been
studied (same objects), 72 shared the same verbal label as
a studied item but differed in visual features (similar objects),
and 36 were new (see Figure 1). Participants indicated, by
key press, whether the item was same, similar, or new. We had
the same object within the object pair tested across all
participants; we had the studied items counterbalanced between
subjects to manipulate the condition of each object shown at
recognition. For same items, the identical image was studied;
for similar items, the alternate member of the pair was studied;
for new items, neither member of the pair was studied. Only
one member of a particular pair was shown on the recogni-
tion test.
RESULTS
The data are presented in Table 2: The proportion of items
given a same, similar,o rnew response is reported as a function
of item type (same, similar, or new), emotion type (negative,
positive, or neutral) and age (young or older adults). We
examined the effects of emotional content and age on the three
different types of items presented at recognition (new items,
items that were similar to studied items, and items that were the
same as studied items; see Figure 1).
New Items
For the new items, we conducted an analysis of variance
(ANOVA) with response (same or similar) and emotion
(negative, positive, or neutral) as within-subject factors and
age as a between-subject factor. This analysis revealed a main
effect of response, F(1, 62)¼60.72, p , .001, partial g
2¼.50,
and a marginal Response 3 Age interaction, F(1, 62) ¼ 3.44,
p , .07, partial g
2¼.05. This interaction reﬂected the fact that
older adults gave more new responses, but fewer similar
responses, to new items than did young adults. Importantly, this
ANOVA revealed neither effects of emotion nor any inter-
actions with emotion.
Similar Items
For the similar items, an ANOVA revealed only a signiﬁcant
effect of response, F(1, 62)¼31.49, p , .001, partial g
2¼.34,
with more similar than same responses given to the similar
items. As with the new items, there was neither an effect of
emotion nor any interactions with emotion.
Table 1. Demographic Information and Mean (SE) Test Scores for Participants in Experiments 1 and 2
Digit Span WAIS-III Digit Symbol WAIS-III Vocabulary
Age Group Gender Age Education MMSE Forward Backward No. completed* AASS % Correct* AASS
Experiment 1
Young adults 10 men 20.1 (.63) 15.1 (.38) 7.09 (.18) 4.69 (.27) 73.1 (2.6) 9.7 (.51) 87.1 (1.0) 16.3 (.37)
22 women Range ¼
18–30
Range ¼
13–20;
Older adults 10 men 73.4 (1.2) 16.5 (.32) 29.3 (.13) 6.88 (.19) 4.19 (.28) 48.3 (2.3) 10.0 (.49) 90.6 (1.3) 16.7 (.42)
22 women Range ¼
65–80
Range ¼
14–22
Experiment 2
Young adults 11 men 20.8 (.57) 14.7 (.34) 7.06 (.27) 5.56 (.30) 66.5 (2.6) 9.8 (.42) 84.6 (2.7) 15.8 (.53)
21 women Range ¼
19–28
Range ¼
13–19;
Older adults 8 men 70.3 (1.1) 16.8 29.0 (.20) 6.56 (.29) 4.88 (.29) 48.4 (2.9) 10.5 (.63) 90.4 (2.2) 16.1 (.44)
24 women Range ¼
67–79
Range ¼
14–23
Notes: Age and education are shown in years. AASS ¼ age-adjusted scaled score; MMSE ¼ Mini-Mental Status Exam (Folstein et al., 1975); WAIS-III ¼
Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale, third edition (Wechsler, 1997); SE ¼ standard error. Older adults completed signiﬁcantly fewer entries on the digit symbol copy
than did young adults, and older adults correctly deﬁned more words on the vocabulary assessment than did young adults; however, the age groups did not differ
from one another in their AASSs on either of these tasks.
*Measure on which there was a signiﬁcant age difference (p , .01).
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For the same items, an ANOVA revealed signiﬁcant main
effects of response, F(1, 62)¼54.87, p , .001, partial g
2¼.47,
and of emotion, F(2, 61) ¼ 11.05, p , .001, partial g
2 ¼ .26.
These main effects were qualiﬁed by an Emotion 3 Response
interaction, F(2, 61)¼11.31, p , .001, partial g
2¼.27, and an
Emotion3Age interaction, F(2, 61)¼4.37, p , .05, partial g
2
¼ .13. Post hoc t tests indicated that the Emotion 3 Response
interaction reﬂected the greater proportion of same responses to
same negative objects as compared with positive or to neutral
ones, t(63) ¼ 4.94, p , .001. The Emotion 3 Age interaction
arose because young adults showed a similar response
distribution for positive and neutral items, p . .25, whereas
older adults gave more same or similar responses to positive
than to neutral objects, t(31) ¼ 2.69, p , .05.
Comparison of Speciﬁc and General Recognition
To further examine the effects of emotion on young and
older adults’ responses to the same items, we calculated
participants’ ability to remember the speciﬁc visual details of an
item (i.e., the proportion of same responses to same items,
referred to as speciﬁc recognition) and to remember at least the
general features of an item, regardless of whether the speciﬁc
visual details were remembered (i.e., the proportion of same
and similar, not new, responses given to same and similar
items).
An ANOVA with recognition (speciﬁc or general) and
emotion (positive, negative, or neutral) as within-subject factors
and age as a between-subject factor revealed main effects of
recognition, F(1, 62) ¼ 83.36, p , .001, partial g
2 ¼ .53, and
emotion, F(2, 61)¼12.45,p , .001,partialg
2¼.29,qualiﬁedby
a three-way Recognition3Emotion3Age interaction, F(2, 62)¼
3.01, p , .05, partial g
2¼.09. Separate ANOVAs conducted on
the speciﬁc recognition and general recognition scores clariﬁed
that emotion affected both memory scores, with F(2, 61)¼9.26,
p , .001, partial g
2¼.24 for speciﬁc recognition and F(2, 61)¼
7.24, p , .01, partial g
2¼.19 for general recognition. However,
there was an Emotion 3Age interaction for the general
recognition scores, F(2, 61) ¼ 3.13, p , .05, partial g
2 ¼ .09,
but not for the speciﬁc recognition scores, partial g
2¼.02. These
results reﬂected the fact that young adults showed enhanced
general recognition for negative items (73%) as compared with
neutral ones (68%), t(31)¼2.32, p , .05, or positive ones (67%),
t(31) ¼ 2.86, p , .01, and no difference between the general
recognition rates for the positive and neutral items, p . .15 (i.e.,
negative . positive¼neutral). By contrast, older adults showed
a boost in general recognition for both positive objects (77%),
t(31)¼2.74, p , .01, and negative objects (77%), t(31)¼3.03, p
, .01, as compared with neutral ones (69%), and no difference in
general recognition rates for the negative and positive items, p .
.15 (i.e., negative¼ positive . neutral).
Table 2. Proportion of Same, Similar, and New Responses as a
Function of Item Type, Emotion Type, and Age in Experiment 1
Response Type Same Similar New
Young adults
Negative objects
Same .54 (.05) .23 (.03) .11 (.02)
Similar .25 (.03 .45 (.03) .24 (.03)
New .21 (.04) .33 (.03) .65 (.03)
Positive objects
Same .41 (.04) .22 (.03) .09 (.02)
Similar .28 (.03) .43 (.03) .23 (.03)
New .31 (.05) .35 (.03) .68 (.04)
Neutral objects
Same .41 (.04) .23 (.03) .09 (.02)
Similar .31 (.02) .42 (.03) .23 (.02)
New .29 (.04) .35 (.04) .68 (.03)
Older adults
Negative objects
Same .67 (.03) .26 (.03) .09 (.01)
Similar .18 (.02) .43 (.03) .19 (.02)
New .14 (.02) .31 (.04) .71 (.03)
Positive objects
Same .52 (.04) .28 (.02) .09 (.02)
Similar .33 (.04) .40 (.03) .19 (.02)
New .15 (.02) .32 (.03) .72 (.03)
Neutral objects
Same .51 (.05) .26 (.03) .11 (.02)
Similar .22 (.03) .40 (.04) .18 (.02)
New .27 (.04) .34 (.03) .71 (.03)
Notes: Responses are shown as the mean, with standard deviation given
in parentheses. Speciﬁc recognition reﬂects the proportion of same responses
to same items, whereas general recognition reﬂects the proportion of same or
similar responses to same or similar items.
Figure 1. Task design: At study, young and older adults viewed
objects for 1,000 ms. One third of the objects were negative (or neg)
and arousing (e.g., tarantula), one third were positive (or pos) and
arousing (e.g., diamond ring), and the other third were neutral (or neu;
e.g., barometer). At test, participants were presented with objects that
were the same as the studied item (identical), similar to a studied item
(sharing the same verbal label but not an identical picture), or new (not
studied). Participants indicated whether the item was same, similar, or
new.
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speciﬁc recognition only for negative items compared with
positive ones, t(63) ¼ 5.19, p , .001, or neutral ones, t(63) ¼
4.94, p , .001, and no difference in speciﬁc recognition scores
for positive and neutral items, p . .15 (i.e., negative . posi-
tive ¼ neutral). Older adults’ general recognition scores for the
positive items also were signiﬁcantly better than those of the
young adults, t(62)¼2.77, p , .01, whereas despite the shorter
retention interval for the older adults, their general recognition
scores for the negative and neutral items were no different than
those of the young adults, p . .15.
DISCUSSION
Emotion had a similar effect on memory speciﬁcity in the two
age groups. For young and older adults, negative items were
associated with enhanced speciﬁc recognition, whereas positive
items were not. These results suggest that negative emotion in
particular facilitates memory for visual detail, and that this
beneﬁt of negative emotion persists across the adult life span.
In contrast to the similar effect of emotion on young and
older adults’ speciﬁc recognition, emotion had divergent effects
on general recognition in the two ages. Young adults showed
a general recognition beneﬁt only for negative (and not for
positive) objects as compared with neutral ones, whereas older
adults showed equivalently elevated general recognition for
negative and positive objects. These results are broadly
consistent with evidence that positive emotion beneﬁts older
adults’ memories more than it does young adults’ memories
(Charles, Mather, & Carstensen, 2003; Hill, van Boxtel, Ponds,
Houx, & Jolles, 2005; Leigland, Schulz, & Janowsky, 2004;
Mather & Knight, 2005). However, the present results suggest
that, in some instances, older adults’ mnemonic beneﬁt for
positive information is limited to extraction of general features
of an item and does not extend to memory for the speciﬁc visual
details of the previously encountered information.
Older adults also showed signiﬁcantly better general
recognition for the positive items than did young adults, yet,
despite the shorter retention interval for older adults, their
general recognition of negative and neutral information was no
better than that of young adults. Although this ﬁnding is
somewhat difﬁcult to interpret because of the different study–
test delay intervals for the young and older adults, it suggests
a relative age-related sparing of general recognition for positive
information as compared with negative or neutral information.
In Experiment 2 we more directly examined this issue by
testing young and older adults after the same delay.
EXPERIMENT 2
A potential concern in Experiment 1 was that we tested
young and older adults after different delays in order to roughly
equate the performance of the two ages. On the one hand, this
matching reduces the concern that age differences in emotional
memory enhancement arise because of different levels of
performance for the neutral items (e.g., more room for
improvement in the older adults than in the young adults).
On the other hand, this matching technique has the potential to
create interactions between age and emotion if the effects of
emotion on memory change over a delay (and see LaBar &
Phelps, 1998), and it also prevents a straightforward compar-
ison of young and older adults’ memory performance. To
circumvent these limitations, in Experiment 2 we examined
whether the different effects of emotion on young and older
adults’ general recognition ability would hold when the two
ages were tested with the same retention interval.
METHODS
Participants
Participants were 32 young and 32 older adults (see Table 1
for demographic information) who met the criteria outlined for
Experiment 1.
Materials and Procedure
The materials and procedure were identical to those of
Experiment 1 except that, in order to avoid ceiling effects in
the young adults, participants studied a larger number of
stimuli: they were presented with 180 stimuli and were tested
with 270 objects. All participants performed the recognition
memory task after a 30-min delay. During the delay, all
participants performed the same cognitive tasks.
RESULTS
The data are presented in Table 3. We examined the effects of
emotionandageonthenew,similar,andsameitems;seeFigure1.
Table 3. Proportion of Same, Similar, and New Responses as a
Function of Item Type, Emotion Type, and Age in Experiment 2
Response Type Same Similar New
Young adults
Negative objects
Same .58 (.03) .23 (.02) .10 (.02)
Similar .23 (.02) .42 (.03) .26 (.02)
New .19 (.02) .35 (.03) .64 (.03)
Positive objects
Same .49 (.02) .21 (.03) .10 (.03)
Similar .27 (.02) .42 (.03) .25 (.02)
New .24 (.02) .38 (.03) .65 (.03)
Neutral objects
Same .48 (.02) .20 (.01) .10 (.02)
Similar .25 (.02) .43 (.03) .25 (.03)
New .26 (.02) .37 (.03) .65 (.03)
Older adults
Negative objects
Same .51 (.02) .24 (.02) .07 (.01)
Similar .25 (.02) .35 (.02) .18 (.02)
New .24 (.02) .41 (.03) .75 (.03)
Positive objects
Same .44 (.02) .26 (.02) .06 (.01)
Similar .35 (.02) .35 (.02) .18 (.02)
New .21 (.01) .39 (.02) .75 (.03)
Neutral objects
Same .40 (.02) .23 (.02) .07 (.01)
Similar .28 (.02) .35 (.02) .19 (.02)
New .32 (.01) .42 (.02) .74 (.02)
Notes: Responses are shown as the mean, with standard deviation given
in parentheses. Speciﬁc recognition reﬂects the proportion of same responses
to same items, whereas general recognition reﬂects the proportion of same or
similar responses to same or similar items.
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nor any interactions with emotion for the new and similar items.
Thus, we focus here on responses to the same items and on the
comparison of speciﬁc and general recognition scores.
An ANOVA with response to same items (same or similar)
and emotion (negative, positive, or neutral) as within-subject
factors and age as a between-subject factor revealed signiﬁcant
main effects of response, F(1, 62) ¼ 95.47, p , .001, partial
g
2 ¼ .61, and of emotion, F(2, 61) ¼ 36.39, p , .001, partial
g
2 ¼ .54. These main effects were qualiﬁed by an Emotion 3
Response interaction, F(2, 61) ¼ 22.84, p , .001, partial g
2 ¼
.43; a Response 3Age interaction, F(2, 61) ¼ 6.06, p , .05,
partial g
2¼.09; and an Emotion3Age interaction, F(2, 61)¼
7.77, p , .01, partial g
2¼.20. Post hoc t tests indicated that the
Emotion3Response interaction reﬂected the greater proportion
of same responses given to same negative objects compared
with positive ones, t(63) ¼ 5.63, p , .001, or neutral ones,
t(63) ¼ 7.44, p , .001. The Response 3Age interaction
emerged because young adults gave more same responses,
t(31)¼2.5, p , .05, and fewer new responses, t(31)¼2.6, p ,
.05, to same items than did older adults (see Table 3). The
Emotion 3 Age interaction reﬂected the fact that young adults
showed a similar distribution of responses for positive and
neutral items, p . .15, whereas older adults gave more same or
similar responses to positive objects than to neutral ones,
t(31) ¼ 6.79, p , .001.
We also calculated participants’ speciﬁc recognition and
general recognition scores as described in Experiment 1. An
ANOVA conducted on these recognition scores with recogni-
tion (speciﬁc or general) and emotion (positive, negative, or
neutral) as within-subject factors and age as a between-subject
factor revealed main effects of recognition, F(1, 62) ¼ 77.91,
p , .001, partial g
2¼.59; emotion, F(2, 61)¼20.99, p , .001,
partial g
2¼.41; and age, F(1,62)¼8.09, p , .01, partial g
2¼
.12. These main effects were qualiﬁed by an Emotion 3
Recognition interaction, F(2, 61) ¼ 5.07, p , .01, partial g
2 ¼
.14, and by a three-way interaction among the factors, F(2,
61) ¼ 3.64, p , .05, partial g
2 ¼ .07.
To elucidate the basis for this three-way interaction, we
conducted separate ANOVAs on the speciﬁc recognition and
general recognition scores with emotion as a within-subject
factor and age as a between-subject factor. For the speciﬁc
recognition scores, the ANOVA revealed a main effect of
emotion, F(2, 61) ¼ 19.97, p , .001, partial g
2 ¼ .40, which
reﬂected enhanced speciﬁc recognition for the negative items
compared with the neutral ones, t(63) ¼ 4.94, p , .001, or
positive ones, t(63) ¼ 5.38, p , .001. The ANOVA also
showed a main effect of age, F(1, 62) ¼ 5.01, p , .05, partial
g
2 ¼ .08, with older adults exhibiting poorer speciﬁc
recognition than the young adults, t(62) ¼ 2.01, p , .05.
Critically, there was no Emotion 3 Age interaction.
The general recognition ANOVA revealed an effect of
emotion, F(2, 61) ¼ 17.64, p , .001, partial g
2 ¼ .37, and
a marginal effect of age, F(1, 62)¼2.99, p , .09, partial g
2¼
.05, qualiﬁed by an Emotion3Age interaction, F(2, 61)¼3.58,
p , .05, partial g
2 ¼ .09. This interaction emerged because
young adults showed enhanced general recognition for negative
items (73%) as compared with neutral ones (68%), t(31)¼3.42,
p , .01, or positive ones (69%), t(31) ¼ 2.57, p , .05. By
contrast, older adults showed a boost in general recognition
both for positive objects (70%), t(31)¼4.98, p , .001, and for
negative objects (67%), t(31)¼3.2, p , .01, as compared with
neutral ones (62%). Older adults’ general recognition scores
for the positive items also were comparable with those of the
young adults, p . .15, whereas their general recognition scores
were lower than those of the young adults for the negative and
neutral items, t(62) ¼ 2.14, p , .05.
DISCUSSION
The results of Experiment 2 generally replicated those of
Experiment 1. Both ages showed an emotion-related enhance-
ment in memory for detail that was restricted to negative items
and did not extend to positive items. Young adults’ emotional
enhancement of general recognition also was limited to
negative items, whereas older adults showed better general
recognition for positive and for negative items than they did for
neutral ones.
The results of Experiment 2 also corroborated the suggestive
evidence from Experiment 1 that aging may leave relatively
preserved the ability to recognize the general theme of positive
information. Although older adults had lower general recogni-
tion scores for the neutral and negative items than did young
adults, the two age groups did not differ in their general
recognition of the positive items. Older adults often rely more
on heuristic processing than do young adults (e.g., Adams et al.,
1990; Gould et al., 1991), and, as discussed in the introduc-
tion, positive items appear to be a class of stimuli that
are particularly prone to this type of schematic processing. It
is plausible that older adults’ relative preservation of general
recognition for the positive items reﬂects the synergy between
the types of information that older adults process well and the
types of information that tend to be recorded for positive items.
In contrast to the preservation of general recognition for
positive items, older adults had lower speciﬁc recognition
scores than did young adults for all items. This result is
consistent with prior investigations suggesting that older adults
do not use memory for visual detail as effectively at retrieval as
do young adults (see Koutstaal, 2003), and it suggests that the
mnemonic boost provided by emotion is not sufﬁcient to bring
older adults’ speciﬁc recognition scores to the same level
demonstrated by the young adults. The implications of these
results will be expanded on in the general discussion.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The fact that young and older adults were able to remember
the details of negative items better than those of neutral items is
broadly consistent with a few prior studies indicating that both
ages are more likely to form vivid memories of negative
experiences than of neutral ones (Comblain, D’Argembeau,
Van der Linden, & Aldenhoff, 2004; Davidson & Glisky, 2002;
Kensinger, Krendl, & Corkin, 2006; Wolters & Goudsmit,
2005). These results suggest that negative emotion can facilitate
memory for detailed information throughout the adult life span.
At ﬁrst blush the enhanced speciﬁcity of memory for the
negative items seems to conﬂict with the ﬁndings of Denburg
and colleagues (2003), who demonstrated that positive and
negative emotion impaired memory for detail while enhancing
memory for the gist or general theme of presented information.
However, it is important to note that, in the present study,
EMOTION AND MEMORY SPECIFICITY P213emotion did enhance memory for the visual details of the
objects themselves. In contrast, in the study by Denburg and
colleagues, memory for details tangential to the emotional
content of the scenes often was required for successful
performance. Prior studies have indicated that, in young adults,
negative emotion can enhance memory for details directly tied
to the emotional stimuli (Burke et al., 1992; Kensinger, Garoff-
Eaton, & Schacter, 2006; Kensinger et al., 2007). The present
results indicate that this beneﬁcial effect of negative emotion on
memory speciﬁcity is consistent across the adult life span.
Recent neuroimaging evidence has suggested that, in young
adults, the enhanced speciﬁc recognition for negative items
may stem from increased engagement of the amygdala and the
fusiform gyrus during encoding of negative items (Kensinger et
al.). The amygdala seems to show relatively little age-related
decline (reviewed by Chow & Cummings, 2000), leaving open
the possibility that amygdala–fusiform modulation of encoding
processes occurs in older adults as well.
Negative items also were remembered with visual detail more
frequently than were positive items, consistent with prior re-
search demonstrating that, in young adults, positive emotion
leads to more gist-based or heuristic processing, whereas nega-
tive emotion leads to more detailed processing (Bless et al.,
1996; Kensinger & Schacter, in press; Levine & Bluck, 2004;
Storbeck & Clore, 2005). Critically, the present ﬁndings suggest
that these divergent effects of positive and negative emotion
remain consistent across the life span. Despite age-related
increases in the prioritization of processing for positive emotion-
elicitinginformation(reviewedbyMather,2006),olderadultsdo
not show enhanced memory speciﬁcity for positive information.
Although emotional content had similar inﬂuences on
memory speciﬁcity in young and older adults, it had divergent
effects on general recognition in the two ages. Whereas young
adults showed a general recognition beneﬁt only for negative
objects as compared with neutral ones, older adults showed
elevated general recognition for positive and negative objects.
These results are broadly consistent with data indicating that
positive emotion has more of an enhancing effect on older
adults’ memories than on young adults’ memories (Charles
et al., 2003; Hill et al., 2005; Leigland et al., 2004; Mather &
Knight, 2005). However, these results suggest that there are
limitations on the types of information better remembered for
positive than neutral information (see also Gruhn, Smith, &
Baltes, 2005). Older adults’ ‘‘positivity effect’’ is limited to
extraction of general information, and it does not extend to
memory for the speciﬁc visual details of previously encoun-
tered positive information.
Not only did older adults show a positivity effect when
comparing their general recognition of positive items to neutral
items, they also showed selectively preserved general recogni-
tion (compared with young adults) for the positive items.
Although older adults are not always as likely as young adults to
remember items with positive emotional content (Denburg et al.,
2003; Gruhn et al., 2005; Kensinger, Piguet, Krendl, & Corkin,
2005), Charles and colleagues (2003) also demonstrated that
age-related deﬁcits in memory can be eliminated for positive
information. It is plausible that when the memory task is
constructed such that memory for the general theme of the
information is sufﬁcient for successful task performance, age
differences in memory for positive items may be reduced or
eliminated. This proposal ﬁts well with previous research
suggesting that older adults sometimes rely more on general
than speciﬁc information when making recognition decisions
(e.g., Kensinger & Schacter, 1999; Koutstaal & Schacter, 1997)
or whenrecalling previouslypresented information(e.g., Adams
et al., 1990; Gould et al., 1991). It may be that older adults can
capitalize on the overlap between the types of information that
they process well and the types of information most likely to be
processed for positive items (i.e., thematic or heuristic in-
formation). Age-related increases in reliance on general in-
formation thus appear to have signiﬁcant consequences for the
performance of older adults in multiple aspects of memory.
In contrast to the equivalent general recognition for positive
items, the presence of emotion never equated young and older
adults’ speciﬁc recognition performance, which is consistent with
evidence that older adults rely less on detailed information when
deciding whether particular items have been studied (Koutstaal,
2003; Koutstaal & Schacter, 1997; Schacter et al., 1997). Thus,
although the presence of emotion can equate some aspects of
young and older adults’ memories, it does not serve to equalize
all aspects of young and older adults’ mnemonic performance.
It is important to note that the present study compared
individuals at extremes of the adult life span (i.e., college-aged
and older adults). Despite this extensive age gap, emotion had
similar effects on speciﬁc recognition in both groups. Although
the results of the present study do not speak to the mechanisms
that lead to the divergent effects of positive and negative valence
on speciﬁc recognition, the results do suggest that these valence-
speciﬁc processes operate throughout the adult life span. In
contrast, the effects of emotion on general recognition ability
appear to change with age, with older adults showing a unique
recognition advantage for positive information. It will be
interesting for further research, including a broader age range
of participants, to examine whether this enhancement in general
recognition for positive information corresponds with adults’
increased reliance on heuristic processing with advancing age.
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